[Ho, boy—this is a dense one.]
The pod-person scream is one of the great innovations of the 1978
Body Snatchers remake. Another—and here I'm comparing it to
the original Jack Finney novel, not to the 1956 film starring RJ Fletcher, although only because I
don't adequately remember that first film—is the fact that at no point in this story does the main character even begin to consider that being replaced by a pod person means anything for the original human being other than death.
The impression I get (slash, fantasy I have) while reading the novel, which explicitly discusses the pod people as a kind of interstellar parasite, is that the original idea must have been an organism that essentially
possesses the human host and takes control of it, but that Jack Finney had the excellent idea that actually seeing replacement humans growing was so creepy that it had to be included. Trouble is, those replacement humans screw up the also-excellent (and otherwise very compelling) question of whether, at a certain point, you might as well just give up fighting and go along with the invasion.
In the novel, the narrator says, "the idea of sleep, of just dropping my problems and letting go; letting sleep pour through me, and then waking up, feeling just the same as I did now, still Miles Bennell—it was shocking to realize how terribly tempting the idea was" (the main objection he has seeming to be that he doesn't want to lose his
humanity, which amounts mainly to his no longer experiencing fear, hatred, or love). What's shocking to
me is that he doesn't question for a second the idea that
he will wake up. In the 1978 movie, it's made explicitly clear (as is already fairly clear in the logic of the novel) that the old you shrivels up and crumble into dust, and a new you, grown from a pod, would rise up and start acting like you. In what meaningful sense
you, then, are waking up as that new pod I have trouble fathoming.
This is only a minor modification of
this question, but that question became renewedly interesting to me when I not only was reminded that intelligent people disagree about it, but also discovered that a (disagreeing, intelligent) friend and I each thought the other was the one who was indulging in magical thinking and who clearly believed in a
soul.
I found this fascinating because while I can imagine someone taking the opposite side from mine—saying that, yes, if a duplicate of you were created, so perfectly that its brain was an exact replica of yours, right down to every synapse and electrical charge, such that that new "you" had
exactly your memories and personality and emotions and consciousness, then that new you
would be you, not just in some kind of theoretical, "for all intents and purposes" sense, but in
every sense (and that if I said, "I'll give you $5 if you get in this machine that will build a new you and disintegrate the old you," there would be no reason for you not to get in the machine because why turn down $5)—while I don't think it's
crazy to believe that, my impulse was certainly to assume that this was because the person believing that must think that some incorporeal essence must jump from one body to the other, some consciousness-as-magical-force: a soul, in short. And yet
here was my friend saying that
I was the one who seemed to think there was some magical soul and that
he was the one being reasonable and materialistic.
My position, the truth of which to me seems crystal clear and sharply defined like HD, is that creating a new you—no matter how perfect the duplication, and whether it's a pod person or a clone or the "teleported" you—has no bearing whatsoever on the original you because the original you is an organism, and whatever happens elsewhere, whatever other identical organisms you create, if you disintegrate the original organism, then that organism dies. And I believe that consciousness is something going on in an organism's brain, and if that brain dies, the consciousness dies. And I believe that if I create a duplicate of something, then those two things might be identical, might be indistinguishable from each other, but they are still two distinct things,
not a single thing, and the existence or nonexistence of the one does not in itself determine the existence or nonexistence of the other.
To me, all the above is fairly concerete, materialistic, and logically sound: really all I'm saying is that consciousness is a
nonmagical property of a physical object, and there is no magical connection between that physical object and any duplicates, no matter how perfect. So how am I the one believing in magic?
My friend, it seemed to me—if he did
not believe that some kind of soul would jump from one body to the other—must believe one of two things: either
- consciousness is so incidental, so meaningless, that our experience of experiencing things is itself an illusion, and there is literally no difference, for anyone, including us, between our experiencing them and an identical mind experiencing them—which to me seems like an instance of the philosophical-theoretical crowding out material reality, a sort of exaggerated hyper-objectivity that can lead a person to take into account everyone but himself—or, similarly but much more reasonably (in my view),
- maybe in some way that's hard for me to wrap my mind around and hard for me to believe, consciousness, while a function of the purely physical, isn't for any particular reason bound to one place—not in a magical way, whereby something is in any sense moving around, but just in that all it is is a collection of concepts that, when thrown together, equal your consciousness, equaling it 100%, such that what it is for you to feel something would be there as well...?
Anyway, I feel like I ended up coming to a kind of resolution, and it lies in the idea—some kind of quantum-physics thing, maybe even the, I know, much-misidentified Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle—that you can know either the identity of something or the position of that thing but never both at once...and frankly I (a) don't really understand that idea, (b) don't necessarily accept it on faith, and indeed (c) tend to think it might be one of those things where pure intellectual theory passes for a description of physical reality in a way that's effectively baloney...but I also know that very smart people think this is true and don't assume I know more than they do, and anyway, whether it's true or not is actually irrelevant because it was the concept that actually got through to me:
Oftentimes, I find, when two rational and intelligent people cannot find common ground on a disagreement, it's either because (a) they're not really having the same conversation—a question of the defining of terms—or because (b) the question being asked is fundamentally flawed.
In a very different context, I recently used this metaphor when giving a friend advice: "You know in high school when you'd be laboring way too long on some Math problem for homework, like the whole assignment was supposed to take 45 minutes and you'd already spent 20 minutes on this one question with nine more questions to go—and it turned out that you were on the wrong page of the textbook: like you were in 11th grade and you were trying to solve a 12th-grade problem? In that case, the answer you were looking for was: 'I'm looking at the wrong question.'"
I think that the reason why my friend and I disagreed—and the reason why each of us thought the other was basing his argument on some sense of a magical soul—was that the question is based on a fundamental impossibility. And I don't mean an impossibility like we lack the technology: I mean an impossibility like this is something that literally cannot be in any sense.
A "you" so exactly you that it really was you couldn't be an alien simulating your body but with new motivation and knowledge and slightly altered personality. Nor could that new you really be in a different place—because if a duplicate you were created right next to you and the original you immediately ceased to be, with consciousness continuing uninterrupted, then the new you would have a vision jump and would not in fact be the same you. The trouble with the "What if the machine malfunctioned and both of you were alive at the same time?" objection is that, in that case, the two of you would not truly be the same. And can two objects not only be identical but exist in the same place at the same time? At a certain point, is the identical-vs.-same distinction I mentioned above no longer a semantic problem but actually flat out meaningless?
If it is not the same, it is not the same. If it is the same, it is the same.
Maybe my friend thought I was being magical in my thinking because he was like, "How can you say that two things that are the same are not the same unless some magical property resides in one of them?"—while I was thinking, "How can you think that two things are the same when they are not the same unless some magical property is transferred from one to the other?"
You are an organism. There is one of you. If you die, you die, whether or not something that looks and acts like you shows up, and even if it thinks it's you. But if it is you, then (a) you're probably not dead, and (b) what the hell are we talking about?
This seems satisfactory to me now but probably will make no sense to me if I reread it. BUT WILL THAT ME REREADING IT REALLY BE ME??*
 |
| This mist isn't going to be you no matter what shape it takes. |
* Yes.